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ABSTRACT
        In 1997, France Télécom, the state-owned French telephone company, went through a partial
privatization.  The government offered current and prior France Télécom employees the opportunity
to buy portfolios of shares with various combinations of discounts, required holding periods,
leverage, tax treatment, and levels of downside protection.  We adapt a neoclassical model of
investment decision-making that takes into account firm-specific human capital and holding period
restrictions to predict how employees might respond to the share offers.  Using a database that tracks
over 200,000 eligible participants, we analyze the employees' characteristics and their decisions
whether to participate; how much to invest; and what form of stock alternatives they selected.  
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I. Introduction 
Many of the proposed solutions to the misalignment of managers’, workers’, and 
shareholders’ interests recommend that managers and workers hold shares in the firms in which 
they work.
1  By giving employees the financial incentives of shareholders, they will act to 
increase shareholder value.  This prescription is embodied in a number of institutional practices: 
the payment of stock (and stock options) to executives and workers as a portion of their 
compensation, the establishment of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), the sale of 
discounted stock to employees, and government mandates that workers of privatized firms buy 
shares in the firms for which they work. 
Yet selling stock to their employees often proves a substantial challenge for companies. 
Workers whose undiversified human capital fluctuates with the fate of their employer may prefer 
to invest their financial assets outside the firm.
2  Furthermore, in many countries, there is still 
little tradition of individuals investing in the stock market.  Finally, in privatizations employees 
may oppose private ownership and may voice their opposition by refusing to buy shares.  Thus 
the sale of company stock to employees represents a large-scale marketing challenge especially in 
privatizations.  Designers of privatization schemes are often instructed to motivate workers to 
buy and hold the firm’s stock, but to respect the budget constraints of the firm (or government). 
In this paper, we study one of the larger privatizations in Europe, which faced this 
problem: France Télécom’s 1997 Ouverture du Capital or “opening of shareholding”. The state-
owned French Télécommunications giant was planning to sell a portion of the firm’s shares to 
private investors, and under French law, needed to induce employees to invest as well.  The firm 
created four distinct investment vehicles for employees.  The schemes were all based upon the 
firm’s common stock, but differed along five dimensions: the level of discounts and free shares 
granted to employees; the access to subsidized financing and additional leverage; the period that 
employees were required to hold the stock; the tax treatment; and finally, the degree of downside 
protection offered to the employee in the event that the stock price declined below the initial 
offering price. 
Our paper analyzes the employees’ response to the firm’s stock offering proposal.  Our 
database consists of information on each of the more than 200,000 past and present France 
Télécom workers eligible to participate.  For each eligible participant, we have personnel data   2 
including their age, tenure, rank, gender, and employment status (civil servant, non-civil 
servant, retiree, or former employee).  We also have information on the number and type of 
shares requested and obtained for each employee.  
We have two related goals in writing this paper.  The first is to describe the employee 
response to the investment offers, addressing three related questions: Which employees chose 
to participate in the employee stock offering plan? How much did they invest in the plan? 
And how did the employees choose from among the four different alternatives?   
Our second goal is to extend existing theory to produce testable implications about 
the investment choices of the worker-investors of France Télécom.  Drawing primarily upon 
neoclassical models of optimal investment and consumption, we build a stylized model of the 
investment choices facing a risk-averse worker-investor whose human capital is partially 
firm-specific, i.e., his labor income is correlated to the firm’s fortunes.  (The model is 
detailed in Appendix A).  We then examine how the size of human vs. financial capital, the 
degree of firm-specificity in human capital, the investors’ horizon, and the degree of relative 
risk aversion should influence the investment choice of the worker-investor.  We relate these 
unobserved parameters to observed employee characteristics to draw implications about 
different investment choices.  For example, our sample includes current workers (both civil 
servants and employees-at-will), retirees, and prior workers still in the workforce.  We appeal 
to these differences to capture levels and firm specificity of human capital. 
We find that employees’ decisions whether to participate in the offering and how 
much to contribute are driven by different factors.  Several groups of employees–especially 
former employees and retirees–participated less frequently, but conditional on participating, 
invested more.  It appears that a threshold level of desired investment must be attained for 
participation to occur, and we measure this threshold in a latent variable framework.  We find 
that employees may forgo benefits equal to one or two months’ salary by failing to 
participate.  We conjecture that this threshold arises due to the cost of analyzing the France 
Télécom offering, and our findings hint at the importance of marketing efforts in the 
employee stock offering. 
We find some evidence of a human capital effect on investing decisions, but the   3 
magnitudes are small.  We use tenure at France Télécom as a proxy for a worker’s firm-
specificity of human capital, and we find that workers with tenure one standard deviation 
above the mean are 0.6% less likely to participate in the offering, and make 11-14% smaller 
personal contributions.  The small size of the human capital effect may be consistent with 
Thaler’s [1998] “mental accounting” hypothesis, which would imply that employees assign 
their financial capital and human capital to different mental accounts, and do not take into 
consideration the correlations between the two sources of risk.  Equally plausible, employees 
with longer tenure may feel more optimistic about the prospects of France Télécom and the 
France Télécom share price. 
The effects predicted by the neoclassical model for financial wealth and salary are 
broadly borne out by the data: Workers with higher financial wealth and salary participate 
and invest more, and, consistent with the notion that as retirement horizon decreases, risk 
aversion increases, we find that older workers tend to invest less.   
While a neoclassical model helps explain broad patterns in employee investment 
behavior, there are still anomalies that it cannot explain.  We document unexpected and 
economically significant seemingly sub-optimal investment choices by France Télécom 
employees.  We are at a loss to explain why.  Many purchased insufficient amounts of (or 
completely shunned) the most attractive investment vehicle offered to them – a downside-
protected stock-based asset. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the challenge 
of selling company stock to France Télécom employees.  Section 3 describes the alternatives 
the government and France Télécom made available to eligible participants in the employee 
stock plan.  These choices allowed employees to trade-off larger discounts in return for either 
longer holding periods or some downside protection.  Section 4 reviews the existing theory of 
investment decision-making and discusses the predictions of this theory as applied to our 
problem.  The formal model we use is detailed in Appendix A to the paper.  Section 5 
describes the data and the variables we use.  Section 6 provides the core of the empirical 
analysis, in which we report on the three aspects of employee response: The decision to 
participate, the quantity of funds invested, and the portfolios. We examine the cross-sectional   4 
dispersion of employee choices as a function of observable characteristics.  Finally, Section 7 
briefly concludes.   
II. The challenge of selling company stock to France Télécom employees 
Selling stock to France Télécom employees was a challenge for three reasons: First, the 
fraction of French individuals with prior experience in stock investing was quite low.   
Second, the privatization of France Télécom had met with political opposition from a large 
number of employees.  Third, at least some employees might appreciate the appeal of 
diversification and be reluctant to invest in the stock of their employer. 
The first challenge for France Télécom and the government was to overcome the 
absence of a tradition of stock market investing by individuals in France.  According to the 
Commission des Opérations de Bourse (the French stock market regulatory body) about 5 
million French individuals held stock in 1997, out of a population of 60 million.
3  This 
reluctance to invest in stocks was even more pronounced for blue-collar workers or civil 
servants that made up the bulk of France Télécom’s employees.
4  Research showed that less 
well-to-do French households were less inclined to hold shares.
5  The choice of many France 
Télécom employees to be civil servants might also indicate a low tolerance for bearing risk or 
a minimal interest in the private sector.  Although no data are available on employees’ 
portfolios of financial assets, anecdotes suggest only a minority was familiar with the basics 
of stocks as investments.
6 
The second hurdle for marketing the stock to employees was political.  Initially, 
France Télécom’s unions opposed its privatization.  France Télécom’s civil servant 
employees enjoyed job security and a generous pension scheme that privatization could 
jeopardize.  On October 12, 1993, 75% of France Télécom employees went on strike against 
privatization.  In 1996, the company negotiated an agreement with unions that defused 
employees' fears.
7  However, a lingering hostility to privatization remained among at least a 
minority of employees.  Moreover, the platform of the Socialist government elected in the 
spring of 1997 explicitly opposed the privatization of France Télécom.  Under the combined 
pressure of fiscal realism and the upcoming deregulation of the European   5 
telecommunications market, the Socialist government performed a quick about-face, and in 
September 1997 officially announced a slightly scaled-back privatization of France Télécom.
8  
The result of  this uncertain  path to privatization was that among France Télécom 
employees, most of those favoring the privatization were recent converts, while those 
opposing it may have felt betrayed and embittered by the Socialist government’s reversal. 
The third obstacle to selling company stock to France Télécom employees was the 
desire of employees to diversify their risk.  Workers whose undiversified human capital 
fluctuates with the fate of their employer may prefer to invest their financial assets outside 
the firm.  To be sure, French labor laws make it costly to fire employees, even if they are not 
civil servants.  But an employee’s firm-specific human capital suffers whenever the firm 
performs poorly, even if he keeps his job: Salary raises and promotions are more scarce, or 
employees may be subject to forced job relocations.  Thus the human capital of France 
Télécom employees was still to be at risk after the privatization, and they may have hesitated 
to add a financial risk closely correlated to their existing human capital risk.
9 
While the firm expended substantial marketing resources to make the offering a 
success, the financial incentives the government could offer to employees were constrained 
by law and politics.  The France Télécom offer to employees was reported to be “the best 
ever agreed to by the State to employees of companies that list their shares in the Stock 
Exchange.”
10  It was not feasible to merely give the shares to employees, so to induce workers 
to buy shares (albeit at a discount) the security designers needed to create an attractive set of 
investments. 
III.  The privatization of France Télécom: The offering schemes 
The challenge of designing employee stock offerings that simultaneously addressed 
the low level of liquid financial wealth of most employees, their risk aversion, their poorly 
diversified human capital and their hesitation with holding shares had been an issue in all of 
the prior French privatizations.  France Télécom adapted the program initially used by the 
French Trésor (Treasury) and Rhône-Poulenc in 1993.
11  In literature describing the program 
to employees, the company outlined the principles that dictated the design of the offerings:   6 
 
“To make the purchase of France Télécom shares accessible to everyone, the offer 
reserved for employees follows five principles: 
 
•  Concentrates a majority of benefits on the first few thousand francs in investment. 
•  Helps each of you to finance your investment by offering payment terms and by 
offering a plan with a bank loan. 
•  Offers a number of choices, and the possibility of investing in more than one plan at 
the same time. 
•  Gives incentives for long-term shareholding to foster the creation of a stable 
shareholder base. 
•  Respects the freedom of choice of each agent and guarantee the confidentiality of the 
operation.” 
 
The desire to offer employees choices was manifested in the fact that France Télécom 
offered its employees four different share ownership programs: Abondix, Multiplix, Simplix, 
and Disponix.  In general terms, the employee could get bigger discounts, more attractive 
financing, tax-free treatment or protection from losses by committing to hold the France 
Télécom shares for a longer period of time.  Table I presents details of each program.  The 
most important characteristics of the plans are as follows: 
•  Effective discount (including price discount from the offering price, matching bonus 
given by France Télécom, and free shares): Abondix was the most advantageous, 
followed by Simplix and Disponix.
12 
•  Required holding period: Abondix and Multiplix required the stock to be held for 5 
years, compared to 2 years for Simplix, and no requirement for Disponix. 
•  Downside protection: Of the four plans, only Multiplix offered downside protection. 
 
Functionally, the Multiplix scheme is quite different from the other three plans.   
Where the other plans offer linear payoffs, Multiplix offers a non-linear, option-style payoff.  
The payoff can be represented as the sum of two components: (a) a risk-free zero-coupon 
bond paying 1.25 times the employee’s personal contribution plus bonus, and (b) 10 call 
options struck at the offer price for each share that the employee bought directly.  Legally, 
this payoff was delivered through a peculiar guaranteed "loan" which allowed the employees 
to buy nine additional shares for each one purchased through personal contributions and 
bonus.
13  The Multiplix option dominates investments in Abondix for a wide range of final   7 
stock prices; it is downside protected and offers much larger upside.  See Figure I for a 
graphical description of the payoffs.   
Each plan’s distinctive feature was well captured in the pamphlet given to employees: 
•  Disponix: “Be able to sell the shares at any time.” 
•  Simplix: “Achieve a balance between offering plan benefits and holding period.” 
•  Abondix: “Acquire numerous benefits and invest for the long term.” 
•  Multiplix: “Multiply, with full security, your savings capacity.” 
All 174,091 current French employees of France Télécom (or of more than 50%-
owned subsidiaries) were eligible to participate.  In addition, 30,985 former employees who 
left the firm between 1991 and 1997 were eligible to participate, but could purchase only two 
of the four plans (Simplix and Disponix).  The group of former employees includes 22,357 
retirees as well as 8,628 former employees who left prior to retirement. 
Overall, the share alternatives were quite attractive to the employees.  To give a sense, 
were an employee to invest 9000 FF, he could buy about 12,000 FF of stock under the 
Disponix plan, 16,312 FF under Simplix and 25,610 FF under Abondix.  (These ignore the 
subsidized financing, avoidance of transaction costs, and tax-free status under Abondix).  
Were he able to invest 9,000 FF in Multiplix, he would receive a package worth between 
27,500 and 39,000 FF, depending on the volatility of France Télécom stock.
14  These are 
substantial benefits, large enough to attract employee attention.  Under the principle of 
allowing employees freedom of choice, the program allowed employees to participate in 
more than one plan, subject to numerous limitations, such as: 
•  Total contributions to the Abondix and Multiplix programs combined in each year 
could not exceed 1/4 of the employees’ gross France Télécom income.  The loan 
implicit in Multiplix would count towards this limit.  This limitation often turned 
out to be binding.  
•  The total personal investment into Multiplix could not exceed FF 9,000. 
•  The maximum request for shares could not exceed FF 823,200. The bonus and the 
bank loan implicit in Multiplix counted towards this total, while free shares were 
excluded.    8 
•  Were the employee offering to be oversubscribed, rationing rules would be 
determined and announced by France Télécom and the government at that time.  
Formal allocation rules were not announced in advance. 
With combinations of the four alternatives, employees could create highly customized 
shareholding packages.  Within the limitations above, they could vary the degree to which 
investments were taxable, the average holding period, the payment options, the average total 
discount (taking into account discounts, bonuses and free shares) and the average number of 
shares with downside protection.   
If we were to ignore taxes, risk aversion, needs for liquidity, and heterogeneity among 
workers, we can solve the linear programming problem suggested by the constraints above to 
calculate the “naïve optimal” (value-maximizing) investment package.  Given the extreme 
discounts offered, investors would certainly participate in the offering.  Our calculations 
show that Abondix and Multiplix, which offer the highest discounts, dominate the optimal 
naïve portfolios.  Whenever the combined constraint on Abondix and Multiplix is binding, 
Abondix is the preferred choice over Multiplix.  While Multiplix delivers a higher return, it 
triggers the most severe program constraints.  Simplix enters the value-maximizing portfolios 
only for small personal investments to take advantage of the free shares, and again for large 
personal investments when the constraint on the combined investment into Abondix and 
Multiplix binds.  
This “naïve optimal” solution obviously ignores the actual situation facing security 
designers who are encouraging these employees to buy shares: 
•  Employees are risk-averse. 
•  Employees have a mix of human and financial capital. 
•  Human capital can be risky and also firm-specific, i.e., its value can be related to 
the value of France Télécom. 
•  Employees may be unable to borrow against their illiquid positions and thus the 
holding period of an investment may be important. 
•  The pool of workers is heterogeneous with respect to these characteristics.   9 
To understand the optimal portfolio under these circumstances, we model the joint 
consumption, investment and portfolio choices of investors. 
IV.  Applying  investment decision-making theory at France Télécom 
In this section we first present the two principal strands of theory dealing with 
portfolio choice decisions: Standard neoclassical models and behavioral finance approaches 
to the portfolio selection problem.  We then use a simple neoclassical model to obtain 
predictions on the employees’ decision about participation, level of investment, and choice of 
investment vehicle in the context of the France Télécom employee offering. 
Standard neoclassical models, as developed in Samuelson [1969] and Merton 
[1969,1971] derive optimal consumption-portfolio decisions from utility maximization by 
rational consumers.  A number of extensions of these models consider portfolio allocation 
decisions when investors have non-diversified human capital or when they face uncertain 
labor income.  Bertaut and Halliasos [1997] solve a life-cycle model in which investors 
choose portfolios in order to buffer against long-run career uncertainty.  An implication of 
their model is that employees with more risky human capital would be less likely to 
participate in the France Télécom offering, and on the margin more likely to prefer a scheme 
with downside protection like Multiplix.  Viceira [1997] solves an infinite horizon 
consumption and portfolio selection problem where labor income is subject to permanent and 
transitory shocks, and employees face an exogenously given probability of retirement per 
period.  He shows that the demand for the risky asset declines as workers approach 
retirement, implying that younger workers would be more likely to participate in the risky 
France Télécom share offering.  If labor income shocks were positively correlated with the 
risky asset (as would be expected in the case of employees purchasing France Télécom 
stock), Viceira demonstrates a negative hedging demand for the risky asset. 
Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson [1992] choose a somewhat different strategy to model 
labor income uncertainty.  They allow human capital to be partly random and partly under the 
control of the investor.  Their main result is that flexibility in labor supply induces higher risk 
taking.  Negative portfolio returns are smoothed out by increased labor supply, especially for   10 
young workers, who can assume relatively more risk in their financial portfolio.  This implies 
greater participation by younger France Télécom workers.  Little empirical work addresses 
how well these models perform in predicting investing behavior.
15 
A quite different theoretical approach to understanding investors’ choices comes from 
the behavioral finance literature.  This approach derives predictions about individual behavior 
based on a set of anomalies reported in the psychology literature and observations from 
experimental studies.  In this literature, individuals are not rational utility maximizers as in 
the neoclassical framework, but instead suffer from mental biases and use simplifying 
heuristics when making decisions.  
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] first incorporated behavioral biases in a formal 
decision theoretic model in their prospect theory model.
16  Their formulation encompasses a 
number of behavioral effects, one of which – loss aversion – is of particular importance for 
portfolio allocation.  Loss aversion means that investors perceive losses relative to the status 
quo as worse than equivalent foregone gains, and investors behave strictly risk-averse even 
for infinitesimal gambles.  Hence prospect theory predicts a strong preference for certain 
outcomes even over favorable bets.  In the context of the employee stock offering at France 
Télécom, prospect theory leads investors to minimize the downside risk of their investments, 
while being less concerned about large up-side potentials.  This might push employees 
toward the Multiplix scheme. 
Mental accounting as described in Thaler [1985, 1990 and 1998], Shefrin and 
Statman [1993 and 1994] and Shefrin and Thaler [1988] refers to the tendency of investors to 
subdivide their total wealth into disjoint accounts and apply different decision rules to 
different accounts in isolation without pursuing overall utility maximization.  In Shefrin and 
Thaler [1988], agents distinguish current wage income, asset income and future income, and 
spend differently out of the present values of these three mental accounts.  Applied to the 
decision situation faced by the France Télécom employees, the mental accounting hypothesis 
casts doubt on the notion that investors consider their human capital when allocating their 
financial portfolio.  
The theory of self-control has received considerable attention in the behavioral   11 
economics literature (Thaler and Shefrin [1981], Schelling [1984], Shefrin and Statman 
[1984]).  The desire to restrain one’s short-term behavior leads investors to adopt rules and 
self-imposed constraints on behavior, such as automatic savings plans or “no-debt” rules.  
The implications of self-control considerations for the employees at France Télécom are 
twofold: Firstly, the long holding periods of the Abondix and Multiplix packages may be 
attractive because they can constrain myopic consumption decisions.  Secondly, if investors 
follow a rule against borrowing, then the fact that the Multiplix package was framed as 
including a bank loan may be detrimental to its success. 
While we are able to intuit some predictions of behavioral theory, when applied to the 
problem at hand, it is often difficult to produce crisp testable hypotheses.
17  While we will 
frame our analysis primarily in terms of neoclassical investment behavior, we discuss later 
how behavioral forces could provide alternative explanations for our results. 
A.  Predictions from a simple model of portfolio selection 
While the neoclassical models of investment behavior are rich, no one model is 
designed to capture the essence of the problem faced by the France Télécom employees.  In 
particular, employees have risky human capital tied to the value of the France Télécom stock, 
have a choice of liquidity (holding period), and can buy assets with downside protection.
18 
We develop a stylized, three-period model to obtain predictions with respect to the 
employees’ decisions about participation, level of investment, and choice of investment 
vehicle in this particular setting.  The model explicitly analyzes how utility-maximizing 
employees would choose among a set of investments that are realistic representations of the 
choices facing the France Télécom workers.  In addition to the France Télécom offerings, the 
investor is given the choice of a riskless asset and an additional risky asset unrelated to 
France Télécom.  Appendix A details the setup of the model and relates it to the existing 
literature.  Starting from a realistic baseline calibration, we analyze the consumption, savings 
and optimal investment by the worker-investor as a function of his relative risk aversion, his 
initial financial wealth, the level of labor income/human capital, the firm specificity of his 
human capital, and the idiosyncratic riskiness of labor income.
19  Selected predictions are 
discussed in the following paragraphs.   12 
Participation rate and investment intensity.  The model predicts that all employees 
will participate in at least one of the employer’s stock choices.  At face value, as more than a 
third of eligible participants choose not to participate, the model obviously fails to capture 
some critical aspect of their decision-making. 
However, the model does predict that the intensity of participation will vary across the 
population.  Bearing out simple intuition and echoing earlier models, it predicts that 
employees who are more willing and able to bear financial risk hold more risky securities:  
•  As relative risk aversion increases, employees shift away from the risky France Télécom 
assets towards cash until they hold only moderate amounts of the downside protected 
Multiplix.  With the baseline calibration, the predicted personal contribution falls from FF 
59,800 for log-utility (relative risk aversion of 1) to FF 2,700 for relative risk aversion of 
20.  
•  As labor income becomes more correlated to the firm, workers invest less in the risky 
financial assets offered by France Télécom.  Again with the baseline calibration, the 
predicted personal contribution is at FF 42,800 for no correlation and falls to FF 2,100 for 
strongly positive correlation between labor income and stock returns (ρ  greater than 0.3).  
•  When labor income (human capital) increases for a given financial wealth then the 
intensity of participation increases, but less than proportional to the increase in labor 
income.  The predicted personal contribution rises from FF 13,600 for no labor income to 
FF 45,800 for an annual labor income of FF 2,000,000.
20 
•  The effect of adding idiosyncratic risk to the labor income process has an ambiguous 
effect on the intensity of participation.  The unavoidable risk in human capital 
discourages risk taking in the financial portfolio, but at the same time increases the 
savings rate for precautionary reasons.  For relative risk aversion of five we find the net 
effect on personal contribution to be positive, while for relative risk aversion of twelve it 
is negative. 
 Mix of investments among participants.  The decision of how to allocate the personal 
savings among the France Télécom assets and the outside alternatives is severely restricted by 
the rules of the offering.  Because the Multiplix plan delivers downside protection and   13 
appreciation on ten shares, it is a nearly dominant security and without additional constraints 
would be part of all participating employees’ choices.  (More generally, Leland [1980] 
suggests that downside protected investments should be more attractive to investors who are 
more risk averse, and we see a similar pattern in our model.)  However, due to the constraint 
on the total amount investable in Multiplix and Abondix combined, the investor has to trade-
off each unit of Multiplix against ten units of Abondix whenever the constraint is binding.  
We focus on the predictions for the relative allocations to the France Télécom assets, since 
any holdings of outside risky or riskless assets are not observable to us.  To further simplify, 
the model abstracts from the distinction between Disponix and Simplix and analyzes the 
choice between the long-lived assets Abondix and Multiplix and a short-lived asset based on 
France Télécom stock.   
•  As relative risk aversion increases, the model predicts that the investor's portfolio of 
France Télécom assets shifts from 87% in the short-lived asset with relative risk aversion 
of 1 to 100% in Abondix with relative risk aversion of 5 and finally to 100% in Multiplix 
with relative risk aversion of sixteen and higher.  
•  As the firm-specificity of human capital (ρ ) increases, the model’s predictions are very 
similar to increasing relative risk aversion: With no correlation, the portfolio of France 
Télécom assets is 71% in Abondix and 29% in the short-lived asset, shifts to 100% in 
Abondix with ρ  equal to 0.1 and finally to 100% in Multiplix with ρ   equal to 0.3 and 
larger.
21  
•  When labor income increases for a given financial wealth, the investor shifts from the 
short-lived France Télécom asset to Abondix and finally to Multiplix.  With no labor 
income, the employee invests 100% in the short-lived France Télécom asset; the worker 
shifts to 100% in Abondix with annual labor income of FF 100,000 and finally to 100% in 
Multiplix with labor income of FF 1,000,000.  This pattern is caused by both the income-
based constraint on the total investment in long-lived assets and by the negative effect of 
increased human capital on the desire to take on additional exposure to France Télécom.   
In our model, as the willingness or ability to take additional exposure to France 
Télécom decreases, the average holding period of the portfolio of France Télécom assets   14 
increases.  This result is due to the investors’ ability to substitute away from the France 
Télécom assets in favor of outside assets.  For very low risk aversion, no firm-specificity of 
human capital or little human capital relative to financial capital, the slightly discounted 
short-lived France Télécom asset is part of the optimal portfolio.  Increasing either risk 
aversion or the exposure to France Télécom causes the investor to replace the short-lived 
asset by assets unrelated to France Télécom, leaving only the long-lived France Télécom 
assets in the observable portfolio. 
The model delivers a set of predictions about the factors that should drive 
participation, extent of contribution, and the mix of stock plans utilized.  These predictions 
are framed with respect to a handful of theoretical parameters: The amount of labor income, 
the firm specificity of labor income, the idiosyncratic risk of labor income, and the 
employee’s risk aversion.  The empirical challenge is to find the best-possible proxies for 
these parameters, which we discuss in the following section. 
V. Data description 
Our data set consists of a unique database of 205,076 current and former employees of 
France Télécom.  The data were kindly provided to us by France Télécom’s Internal 
Shareholders Department.  For each individual we have data on age; gender; job tenure; job 
category; salary grade; whether the employee is currently employed, formerly employed or 
retired; and the location of the employee’s business unit.  We also have information on the 
number of shares demanded and obtained by each employee.  Finally, we have the town and 
the postal code of the employee’s home, which we have matched to demographic data from 
the INSEE, the French government statistical agency.  Table II provides summary statistics 
for some of the observed variables. 
Amount of human capital.  The present value of labor income (human capital) is a 
function of the current level of salary, its growth rate, and the time horizon over which salary 
will be received.  Current salary captures the first component and age captures the third 
aspect of human capital, with younger workers generally having more human capital (future 
value of labor income) than older workers.  We can observe an employee’s salary grade, from   15 
which we can estimate his or her salary.
 22  In addition, we can identify retirees, whose human 
capital (future labor earnings) is presumably small.
23 
Firm specificity of human capital.  We have a number of proxies for the firm-
specificity of human capital.  First, we can identify former (non-retired) workers versus 
current workers.  The former would have no France Télécom firm-specific capital, as they 
were no longer in the firm’s employ.  For current workers, we use job tenure as a proxy for 
firm-specificity of human capital.  Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests that 
tenure is a good measure of this variable.
24  In the empirical analysis, we distinguish the 
tenure effect between civil servants and non-civil servants.  While the firm-specificity of 
human capital increases in tenure for both groups, we would anticipate that the job security 
implicit in the civil servant status makes this effect less relevant for civil servants.  
Idiosyncratic shock to human capital.  The possibility of a sudden shock to human 
capital should affect the worker’s investment decision.  Here we exploit the differences 
between the civil servant employees of France Télécom and the non-civil servants.  The 
former have much more job security than the latter and thus, we argue have lower levels of 
idiosyncratic labor shocks. 
Financial wealth.  We do not directly observe the financial wealth of the workers, but 
we construct an instrument based on the worker’s choice of residence.  We match the towns 
of the worker’s residence to the INSEE (French National Statistical Service) database, and 
use the average income of the households in the same town as a rough measure of wealth.  
Our logic is that choice of residence is a function of wealth (and income) and given the large 
disparities between towns and neighborhoods, it captures some of the unmeasured variation 
in household wealth. 
Other control variables.  To test Viceira’s [1997] predictions that time to retirement 
can affect employee’s retirement motives to invest in risky assets, we also control for 
employee age and age-squared.  Age is a variable that could have many interpretations in this 
analysis.  Not only does it capture years to retirement, but also it affects human capital, 
financial capital and the ratio of the two.
25  Younger people have large future labor income 
but smaller financial assets, whereas older people have smaller remaining future labor income   16 
and larger financial assets.  At some point, financial assets begin to dwindle as people use 
them to pay for children’s education, support of aging parents or retirement, and to capture 
this non-linearity, it is appropriate to include not only an “age” variable, but a squared age 
term as well.
 26 
Prior research, such as Barber and Odean [1999], suggests that men and women make 
different investment decisions.  They attribute this to differences in self-confidence, but more 
generally gender differences could reflect other factors as well, such as risk aversion.  To 
account for these differences, we include gender as a control variable. 
 Omitted variable bias and risk aversion.  In spite of the uniqueness and breadth of 
our database, we acknowledge that some potentially very helpful data have not been made 
available.  For example, we have no information on employees’ marital status, number of 
children, whether their spouse is an employee of France Télécom, and whether the employee 
is a homeowner.  Clearly, such variables have bearing on France Télécom employees’ 
participation in the share offering.  Nor do we have information on employees’ promotion 
history, union affiliation, training, or other portfolio holdings, which may have influenced 
employees’ attitudes toward the offering.   
While some of these variables might be made available at some time, the one key 
variable that will always be unavailable is risk aversion.  However, other observable variables 
could be related to risk aversion.  Absolute risk aversion should decrease with total wealth 
and income.  Wealthier workers may be more willing to buy risky assets than less wealthy 
workers.  The decision to become a civil servant may reflect higher risk aversion; if so, civil 
servants might be less likely to participate in the offering.  Risk aversion may change over a 
person’s lifetime, so older people may become more risk averse.  Risk aversion could differ 
between men and women.  It is prudent to remember that there is no independent measure of 
risk aversion, virtually all observable variables may be correlated with it, and thus it may be 
difficult to interpret the empirical results.   
   17 
VI. Empirical  results 
  We first present our results on participation and investment intensity, focusing on the 
discrepancies between the two, which we interpret as evidence of a threshold effect.  We then 
turn to how employees allocated their investment among the various plans. 
A.  Participation and investment intensity 
The theoretical model we developed predicted that all eligible current and former 
employees would participate, and that the “average worker” (as determined by our baseline 
calibration but with no human capital at risk) should invest about FF 26,000 in the offer.  
Table III, Panel A shows that the participation rate was 62.8% overall (68% among current 
employees).  Thus, the neoclassical model fails to predict that a significant fraction of eligible 
worker-investors chose to pass up entirely the sizeable benefits attached to the various 
offering plans.  Panel B shows that the actual investment among workers –conditional on 
participating– was FF 26,554 suggesting that our model calibration is reasonable. 
To test our predictions regarding participation and investment intensity we run a 
Probit regression of the probability of participation on individual characteristics, and a 
truncated regression of personal contribution on the same set of characteristics.  
Unlike the Tobit model, the truncated regression framework allows the determinants 
of the participation decision to differ from the amount of investment decision without merely 
throwing away zero-investment observations and biasing the results.  It can accommodate 
reasonable deviations from the standard choice setting: for example, even when the optimal 
contribution level is non-zero, participation may still not occur due to search, information and 
transaction costs.  Similarly, the potential investor may first decide whether the offering is 
worth analyzing, and only if the answer is in the affirmative, go on to decide the desired 
contribution level.
27  We report our results for the Probit regression in Table IV, Panel A, 
and the results for the truncated regression in Panel B.
28  
  We predicted a negative effect of tenure (a proxy for the firm-specificity of an 
employee’s human capital) on participation and personal contribution.  These predictions are 
partially supported by the data.  Tenure has a negative effect on participation only for non-
civil servant current employees, who may have felt that their jobs would be most at risk in   18 
case France Télécom did poorly.  Longer tenure is also weakly associated with a smaller 
personal contribution, especially for current non-civil servants who decrease their personal 
contribution by 460 FF for each additional year of job tenure.  Assuming tenure is a good 
proxy for firm-specific human capital, either (a) Employees have little firm- specific human 
capital; (b) Human capital is not at risk; (c) Employees may have treated their human capital 
and financial capital in separate “mental accounts” (Thaler [1998]) and failed to take into 
account the underdiversification resulting from investing in company stock. 
According to the neoclassical model, labor income and financial wealth should be 
associated with higher levels of participation and personal contribution.  We find strong 
support for this prediction.  Inspecting the relationship between salary grades and coefficients 
in the first column of Table IV,  Panel A, there is nearly a monotonically-increasing 
relationship between salary levels and the propensity to participate, even after controlling for 
age, tenure, civil servant status and job category.  Moving from the lowest salary grade for 
“ordinary employees” to the lowest salary grade for “middle managers,” the probability of 
participating increases 58 percentage points. In Column 2 of Panel A, we estimate the actual 
level of salary, and the coefficient on salary is the most significant determinant of 
participation.  
Our instrument for wealth also has a positive impact on participation.  We incorporate 
both wealth term and a square of wealth to allow for nonlinearities in the wealth-participation 
relationship.  The coefficient on wealth is positive, suggesting that as wealth increases 
participation is more likely, and the squared term is negative, which suggests that this 
relationship flattens off or could even turn around at high levels of wealth.  Over the range of 
data in our sample, the first-order term dominates the squared term for 95-99% of all the 
employees, producing a positive relationship between wealth and participation for virtually 
all of the participants in our sample.  These findings are consistent with the notion that 
employees with greater total wealth have lower absolute risk aversion and are therefore more 
willing to invest in risky assets. 
Higher-paid workers not only are more likely to participate, but also to invest more in 
the stock-offering plan, as shown in Table IV, Panel B.  Moving from salary grade 11 to   19 
salary grade 31 (31 to 41) results in a FF 10,000 (14,000) increase in personal contribution. 
The impact of wealth on amount invested is consistent with this finding.  The squared INSEE 
wealth measure dominates the first-order term, suggesting that increases in our wealth 
instrument are correlated with higher contribution amounts.
29  These results are also 
consistent with the comparative statics from our model.
30 
We predicted that adding idiosyncratic risk to labor income has an ambiguous effect 
on the willingness to participate in the offering.  For relative risk aversion of five we 
predicted the net effect on investment intensity to be positive, while for relative risk aversion 
of twelve to be negative.  Based on the Probit marginals evaluated at the means, civil servants 
are about 7 percentage points less likely to participate (calculated from the first specification 
in Table IV, Panel A).  This observation is compatible with civil servants having less labor 
income uncertainty, and a level of relative risk aversion of five across both civil servants and 
non-civil servants.  The interpretation is complicated by the fact that civil servants and non-
civil servants are likely to differ on more than one (unobserved) dimension.  An alternative 
explanation for the lower participation among civil servants could be higher average risk 
aversion, evidenced by their revealed preference of taking a civil servant position.  If civil 
servants have both higher job security and higher risk aversion than non-civil servants, then 
the predicted negative effect of risk aversion may overwhelm the predicted positive effect of 
higher job security.  An alternative explanation is that perhaps some residual opposition 
against the privatization existed.  Such opposition may have been more likely among 
employees who joined France Télécom fully expecting a lifelong public sector career, and 
who may have felt betrayed when France Télécom turned itself into a privately-owned entity. 
We find that older employees are less likely to participate in any of the stock purchase 
plans, with workers one standard deviation older about 4% less likely to participate.  On the 
other hand, age is associated with a larger personal contribution (conditional on participating) 
over almost the entire age range of employees.
31  According to Viceira’s [1997] model, 
investors closer to retirement will be more risk-averse, since they expect their propensity to 
consume out of wealth to go up soon.  Hence our finding on participation is consistent with 
the idea that this negative effect of age on the demand for risky assets overwhelms the   20 
positive effect of diminished firm-specific human capital on the hedging demand for the risky 
asset.
32  The positive effect of age on personal contribution is compatible with the human 
capital effect dominating, or with age proxying for unaccounted variation in personal wealth.  
In the extreme, we see that retirees are much less likely to participate in the stock plan than 
are current workers, also consistent with Viceira’s hypothesis.  Retirees were 30% less likely 
to participate, evaluating the Probit coefficients at their mean values. 
Finally, while we have no clear hypothesis for why gender should affect the decision to 
participate in the stock plans, it does have an effect.  Women were about 5% more likely to 
participate than men.  This might result from differences in family status: French households 
are more likely to have two incomes if the woman works than if the man works.  It could also 
reflect differences in risk aversion
33, or a more careful reading of the plan documents.  We 
merely report the result as consistent with the notion that gender has some impact on this 
investment decision. 
B.  Discrepancies between the participation and personal contribution: a threshold 
effect 
Our most surprising finding is that several employee characteristics have opposite 
effects on participation and personal contribution.  For example, while women are more 
likely to participate than men, they contribute less.  The same is true of retirees and former 
employees, and is most vividly seen in Panel A and Panel B of Table III: former employees 
were much less likely to participate than current employees (22% vs. 68%).  However, 
conditional on participating, the personal contribution of former employees is much higher 
(in absolute terms and as a percentage of monthly salary).
34  This is strong evidence that the 
decisions of whether and how much to invest may be driven by different factors, rather than 
as a result from a single optimizing decision by employees. 
One explanation is that a threshold level of desired investments (latent demand) must 
be attained for participation to occur.
35  When this threshold is higher, participation rates are 
low, but contributions (if made) are high.  What might account for such a threshold?  Our 
suspicion, reinforced by our discussions with management, is that our findings could be 
explained by the substantial “cost” (in time and effort) for employees to evaluate the France   21 
Télécom offer.  The offering documents sent to employees include a fair bit of legal 
paperwork, and as Section 3 attests, analyzing the nuances of the four different plans can be 
taxing, especially for investors unfamiliar with investing (and even for finance academics!).  
As in models with search costs, self-selection becomes critical: Employees for whom this 
“analysis” cost is higher are less likely to participate, but conditional on participating will 
invest more. 
Testing this explanation is difficult because it is not obvious why “analysis costs” 
would vary across groups.  Various groups could differ in their innate levels of diligence (for 
example, male employees may have spent less time analyzing the offering in detail than 
female employees), but we have we no way of measuring these differences.  France Télécom 
assured us that the marketing effort devoted to the offering was spread evenly across 
employees, so there is no reason to think that some employees got better access to 
information than others.   
But France Télécom management also conceded to us that having former employees 
and retirees invest in the offering was not a top priority, and the marketing effort toward them 
was much lower than toward current employees.  The offering was aggressively marketed or 
“pushed” toward current employees, while it was merely made available to former employees 
or retirees.  Current employees could hear presentations on the offer and compare notes with 
one another, while former employees had to make the decision on their own.  We hypothesize 
that this difference could explain the difference in participation and personal contribution.  If 
"search costs" were lower for current employees, we would expect the determinants of 
participation and personal contribution to diverge less for current employees than former 
employees or retirees.
36  Comparing columns between the equivalent specifications in Panels 
A and B in Table IV, we find that such is indeed the case, lending support to our threshold 
explanation. 
While we cannot be sure that our threshold explanation is correct, we can measure the 
apparent size of the thresholds for various subgroups of employees, letting the data tell us the 
level of latent demand below which certain potential participants have chosen to forego 
participating.  With non-zero thresholds of participation, the truncated regression model   22 
presented for personal investment levels (Table IV, Panel B) is misspecified.  When 
estimating a Tobit-type model using Heckman’s [1976] two-step estimator, we do not impose 
equality of the coefficients from the first-step (participation Probit) and second-step 
(contribution amount) regressions.  Combining the estimates from the first-step Probit 
regressions and the second-step contribution amount regression, we can back out the implied 
threshold levels for different groups of individuals.
37  The procedure for estimating group-
specific threshold levels is detailed in Appendix B. 
Panel A of Table V shows the average threshold level estimates for different subsets 
of individuals.  A value of FF 18,749 for the reference group of currently employed male 
non-civil servants implies that, on average, individuals of this group do not participate if their 
desired (latent) investment is smaller than this threshold.  The incremental thresholds for 
women, civil servants, former employees and retirees are to be added to this baseline 
threshold.  The estimated threshold of latent demand to induce participation for retirees is 
43% higher than for current male workers, and 70% higher for former (non-retired) France 
Télécom employees than for current male workers.   
Panel B of Table V uses these thresholds to calculate how much monetary value in 
bonuses, discounts and free shares an investor whose latent demand is just below the 
threshold forgoes by opting not to participate.
38  In essence, this calculation estimates how 
much money investors at the threshold limits were willing to “leave on the table” by not 
participating.  Retirees and former employees have substantially higher demand thresholds, 
but because they were not eligible to participate in the most financially-attractive 
investments, they actually left less money on the table than current workers, about the 
equivalent of one-month’s salary (for a mid-level manager.)  Current workers threshold levels 
were lower, but they passed up benefits equal to 1.7 month’s salary, because they could have 
enjoyed more generous terms than former employees. 
While we believe the threshold story is plausible, we are open to alternative 
explanations.  One possibility is that the differences in participation and investment amounts 
could be attributed to certain groups of employees attempting to “game” the system by 
requesting more shares than they actually wanted, in order to end up with a post-rationing   23 
amount they desired.  But as we note earlier, the rationing rules were not announced in 
advance, so it may have been difficult to place orders strategically.  Further, we were told that 
employees were surprised that any rationing took place, suggesting that their requested 
investments were their desired investments.  Nevertheless, suppose employees were 
completely prescient, and could predict how many shares they would be allocated conditional 
on their requests.  It would then be appropriate to analyze the post-rationing allocations of 
shares rather than the original orders.  When we repeated the truncated regressions in Table 
IV, Panel B using the ex post measure of wealth invested, the results were virtually identical 
to those we report in the table.  This suggests that while gaming may have been a problem, it 
cannot explain the inconsistency between the determinants of participation and investment 
amount. 
C.  Type of offer 
How did participating employees allocate their funds among the four plans?  Recall that 
the main characteristics of the plans were as follows: 
•  Disponix: No holding period, small discounts. 
•  Simplix: 2-year holding period, moderate discounts. 
•  Abondix: 5-year holding period, large discounts. 
•  Multiplix: 5-year holding period, downside protection. 
 
Table III, Panel C reports the actual frequencies with which the different assets are 
chosen.  For current employees, the two long-horizon plans with large discounts were 
favored: Abondix is the most preferred package, followed by Multiplix.
39  We also analyze the 
frequencies of particular asset combinations by different groups of individuals.  For current 
employees, pure Abondix is by far the most preferred choice, followed by the Abondix-
Multiplix combination.  Employees heavily weighted their portfolios to long-horizon/high 
discount offerings with all but 2.2% of eligible participating employees buying Abondix, 
Multiplix or both. The average participant selects a plan with required holding period of 4.6 
years, thus heavily tilting his portfolio to the long-horizon plans.  In general, the average 
employee portfolio is very much like the utility-maximizing portfolios we derive from our 
model.    24 
Our model not only suggests the overall composition of the “optimal portfolios,” but 
also how portfolio characteristics should vary among participants. We stress two functional 
characteristics of the portfolios: the average chosen holding period and the fraction of the 
portfolio protected by puts (invested in Multiplix).  This analysis is conducted only for 
employees who chose to contribute and is limited to current employees (as former employees 
and retirees did not have access to the longest horizon or downside protected plans.) 
With respect to holding period, we have several testable hypotheses: Holding period 
should increase with the firm-specificity of human capital, relative risk aversion and labor 
income.  We see the first two effects in the first column of Table VI.  As the neoclassical 
model predicts, the chosen holding period rises with tenure, our measure of firm-specific 
human capital, and is higher for civil servants, who are likely to be more risk averse.  Holding 
period should decrease with initial financial wealth, which is confirmed by the negative 
coefficient on the INSEE wealth measure.  The finding that holding period decreases in labor 
income is inconsistent with our predictions, and again most likely caused by insufficient 
control for wealth.  (Salary and wealth effects should go in opposite directions, and the more 
precise salary variable is probably picking up wealth effects.)  In addition, we find that 
women choose longer holding periods than men.   
The second column in Table VI analyzes the fraction of the portfolio invested in 
Multiplix, the plan with downside protection.  Our model predicts the desired downside 
protection to be increasing in relative risk aversion, firm specificity of human capital, labor 
income and weakly in idiosyncratic labor income risk.  Consistent with the predictions, we 
find that the downside-protected share is increasing in tenure and that civil servants, whom 
we expect to be more risk averse, purchase more Multiplix.  The tenure effect is barely 
significant.  Higher labor income tends to increase the downside-protected share, again 
conform to the model predictions.  Given the limitations on the amount that employees could 
invest into Multiplix, our model predicts a strong negative coefficient on wealth.  This 
prediction is confirmed by the negative coefficient on the INSEE wealth measure. 
Overall, a few preliminary salient facts emerge from the analysis of portfolio 
allocations.  Investors seem undeterred by long holding periods.  Over 90 percent of currently   25 
employed participants choose some assets with the five-year holding periods, and over 90 
percent of former employees choose some assets with a two-year holding period.
40  T h e  
portfolio compositions are roughly consistent with our predictions regarding wealth and firm-
specific human capital, suggesting that the neoclassical model is not at odds with the data. 
D.  Deviations from “optimal” portfolios.  
While our results are generally consistent with a neoclassical model, we also find that 
employees sometimes deviated from optimal portfolio choice.  To understand these 
deviations, we examine the choice of Abondix vs. Multiplix.  Both plans had a holding period 
of five years.  Ignoring the constraint that no more than one quarter of annual gross salary can 
be invested into Abondix and Multiplix combined, Multiplix dominates Abondix: Multiplix 
offers more value per Franc invested and is downside protected.
41  Hence no (weakly) risk-
averse investor should choose Abondix over Multiplix as long as the salary-based constraint is 
not binding.
42  This strong prediction will hold for any concave, non-decreasing utility 
function and is testable.   
We examine those investors who selected a portfolio that includes some long-term 
assets (Abondix and/or Multiplix
43) and whom the salary constraints would have allowed to 
substitute a share of Multiplix for Abondix.  By making this substitution, the investor could 
have increased the value of his portfolio at no additional cost while simultaneously making 
her investment safer.
44   
The results from this exercise are striking: There are 74,023 participants for which the 
relevant salary constraint is not binding, and of these 71,253, or 96%, purchase too many 
units of Abondix relative to Multiplix.
45  Even more striking, there are 47,136 investors in the 
sample for whom the salary-based constraint is not binding and who invest in Abondix, but 
do not invest in Multiplix at all.  Conditional on their willingness to hold an asset with a five 
year holding period, this choice is hard to reconcile with utility maximization.   
These suboptimal decisions are economically significant: Ordering investors by the 
amount of money left on the table, the mean inefficient investor could have increased the 
value of his portfolio by FF 7,682 (37.2%) without changing the holding period of his 
portfolio or bearing any conceivable costs.
46  Since we can perform our test only on investors   26 
who invest small amounts relative to their salary income, one can argue that the sub-optimal 
behavior may be restricted to small and probably less sophisticated investors.  It is also 
possible that the violations of expected utility theory are restricted to the non-linear asset 
Multiplix.  The payoff and benefits of Multiplix may not have been well understood by many 
France Télécom employees.  However, a violation of investor rationality of this order of 
magnitude casts considerable doubt on the notion that the portfolios are chosen optimally. 
E.  A measure of the value of liquidity for a subset of investors 
The institutional structure of the France Télécom employee offering enables us to 
estimate the value that employees put on the liquidity or their ability to sell their France 
Télécom stock holdings at will.  For the purpose of this analysis, it is convenient to focus on 
former employees and retirees, who were restricted to the Simplix and Disponix plans.   
Disponix could be sold immediately after the offering, and gave a small amount of free shares 
and discounts.  Simplix  gave more free shares and discounts but had to be held for two years.  
Hence retirees and former employees were given the choice of trading off more free shares 
and discounts for less liquidity.  
Of the 8,672 participating retirees and former employees, 82% chose a pure Simplix 
portfolio offering high discounts but a two-year adding period.  Only 6% chose pure 
Disponix, and 13% combined Simplix and Disponix.  While investors who chose only one 
asset can be seen as at a corner solution of their individual optimization problem, the 
investors who chose interior combinations reveal their marginal trade-off between portfolio 
value and liquidity.  We calculate the change in portfolio value for the interior investors when 
(i) the total investment into Disponix is replaced by Simplix and (ii) the Disponix holding is 
reduced by one share, and the Simplix holding is increased by one share.
47 
The average interior investor could have increased the value of his portfolio by 9.9% 
by replacing his entire holdings of Disponix through Simplix.  Simultaneously, the required 
holding period of his portfolio would have increased from 2.08 years to 3 years.  At the 
margin, the average interior investor would have increased the value of his portfolio by FF 45 
when replacing one unit of Disponix by a unit of Simplix and FF 36.40 in cash.  The marginal 
trade-off between portfolio value and holding period can be identified by dividing the   27 
marginal change in value through the marginal change in holding period, and averaging 
across investors.  This calculation yields a value of FF 9,460 or 12.2% of portfolio value, 
indicating that the average interior investor trades off a 12.2% increase in portfolio value for 
a one-year increase in holding period at his individual optimum.  We cannot judge this 
behavior as suboptimal, but it gives a sense of how strongly one subgroup of investors values 
the ability to rebalance their portfolio at will.   
F.  Other behavioral explanations 
Behavioral finance, grounded in the psychological aspects of decision making, 
provides alternative explanations for some of the empirical results we report here.  Based on 
a naïve understanding of loss aversion, we expected Multiplix to prove to be even more 
attractive than our model predicts, as it offered complete downside protection, as well as a 
sizeable share of the upside on the France Télécom stock.  However, as we note above, more 
than half of participants invested nothing in Multiplix (Table III, Panel C) and the fraction 
of contribution in protected shares was not substantially larger than we anticipated.  Further, 
on the margin, employees not at their salary limit constraints could have improved their 
wealth (and utility) by substituting Multiplix for Abondix (see section 6 (d) above). Perhaps 
employees not used to the hazards of stock market investing underestimated the volatility of 
the France Télécom stock, especially over a five-year period.  Or perhaps loss aversion 
conflicted with a self-control rule against borrowing: the fictional bank loan embedded in 
Multiplix may not have been recognized as fictional. 
The small size of the human capital effects may be due to many factors,
48 but could be 
consistent with the mental accounting hypothesis (Thaler [1998]).  If employees assigned 
their France Télécom human capital to a different account than their France Télécom 
financial capital, they will not have perceived the increased risk exposure due to the 
correlation of the two.  Given the mental accounting effects documented in the behavioral 
literature when just money is at stake, the mental separation of human and financial capital is 
plausible.  Equally plausible, employees with longer tenure may feel optimistic about the 
prospects of France Télécom, and be confident about their knowledge of the prospects of 
France Télécom.  When people are given more information on which to base a forecast or   28 
assessment, accuracy of their forecasts tends to improve much more slowly than their 
confidence in the forecasts.  Thus, additional information can lead to an illusion of 
knowledge and foster overconfidence.
49  
Loyalty effects may have been at work in the offering.  Employees in the high-salary 
range may be better performers and therefore feel greater loyalty to France Télécom, and 
express it through more participation and more personal contribution. 
  We find these post-hoc behavioral explanations of our findings unsatisfying, in part 
reflecting of what Laibson and Zeckhauser [1998] label the “promiscuous prediction 
problem”: behavioral theories may yield opposite predictions, and allow too many degrees of 
freedom.  However, as Laibson and Zeckhauser note, “the promiscuous prediction problem 
also plagues mainstream economics.  Both behavioral models and standard economics 
models are often so flexible that almost any outcome can be explained by them.”  
VII. Conclusions 
  The partial privatization of France Télécom offers an interesting setting for analyzing 
the investment decisions of individuals with human and financial capital at risk.  We develop 
a neoclassical model that attempts to capture the essential features of the decision facing 
employees, and compare the predictions of our model to the observed participation of France 
Télécom employees.   
The data are consistent with many predictions from the simple neoclassical model.  In 
general terms, we expect that employees who are better able and willing to bear risk will 
participate in the stock offers.  We find evidence to this effect.  Wealthier workers and those 
who are better paid are more likely to buy shares in France Télécom, consistent with the 
predictions of the model, and invest more in the firm.  They also invest more in short-horizon 
assets and less in Multiplix, given the plan limitations on their investments in long-horizon 
assets. 
Our most surprising finding is that the decisions whether to participate and how much 
to invest are driven by different factors. It seems that a threshold level of desired investments 
must be attained for participation to occur, perhaps because of the cost to employees of   29 
analyzing the offering.  We attempt to measure the size of these thresholds, and find that 
employees may forgo benefits equal to one to two months of salary by failing to participate.  
We interpret this finding as manifesting to the importance of marketing efforts in the 
employee stock offering, but recognize that alternative explanations might be at work.   
Our empirical analysis reveal a related puzzle: human capital considerations suggest 
that former employees should have been the most eager participants, followed by currently 
employed civil servants, and finally by non-civil servants.  We find the opposite pattern.  
Among current employees, we do find some evidence of human capital effects, but they are 
small: one standard deviation of tenure above the mean is associated with 0.6% less 
likelihood of participation, and with 11%-14% less personal contribution, conditional on 
investing.  Employees may have fallen prey to a “mental accounting” illusion, treating their 
human capital separately from their financial capital, and neglecting the risk due to the 
correlation between the two. 
We also document a clear-cut and economically significant asset allocation anomaly 
by France Télécom employees: many purchased insufficient (or zero) amounts of the most 
attractive investment vehicle offered to them – a downside-protected stock-based asset.   
Merely creating and offering a superior investment vehicle does not guarantee that investors 
will buy it.   
For a subset of participants, we can measure the apparent value that investors place on 
an additional year of holding period.  This crude measure gives us a window into how 
individual investors value liquidity and the apparent value is substantial.  We also find that 
men and women invest differently with respect to their likelihood of participating, the levels 
of their investments and their chosen portfolios.   
While this empirical study uses imperfect data to test highly stylized models, we 
believe that work of this sort can be very valuable in revealing how investors make decisions.  
Our theories and understanding can be challenged and ultimately enhanced by detailed 
examination of actual investment behavior. 
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Appendix A 
Setup of a simple model of portfolio selection 
Our stylized three-period model provides intuition and testable predictions of the 
determinants of portfolio choice in a setting with risky labor income, incomplete markets and 
a binding choice of holding period.  
 Markets are incomplete along three dimensions: Firstly, 
there is no borrowing at either the risky or riskless rate.  This extends the liquidity constraints 
that have gained prominence in the literature on precautionary savings (Deaton [1991], 
Browning and Lusardi [1996]).  Second, idiosyncratic labor income risk is not insurable 
(Bodie, Merton and Samuelson [1992], Bertaut and Haliassos [1997], Viceira [1997]).  Since 
labor income is exogenous in our model, the associated risk is related to the concept of 
unavoidable background risk (Gollier and Pratt [1996]).  Finally, there are no markets in the 
long-lived assets between the date of purchase and the maturity date.  
  There are two distinguishing characteristics of our model.  First are the state-
dependent period two budget constraints: An investor cannot sell any of the long-lived assets 
purchased in period one to finance consumption or new investments in period two.  Thus the 
period two consumption and investment decision depends on three factors: The amount of 
consumable financial wealth, realized period-two labor income, and the value of and 
composition of the non-consumable portion of financial wealth.  Second are the numerous 
discounts, matching bonuses and free shares as well as the constraints on the amounts that 
can be invested.  It is not clear whether the general predictions from the portfolio selection 
literature continue to hold with this unusual investment opportunity set, which we therefore 
model explicitly. 
Worker-investors choose their investment and consumption in three periods, subject 
to shocks to both risky financial assets and risky labor income.  The investment choice set–
modeled to closely reflect the choices facing the France Télécom workers–includes the assets 
from the France Télécom offering and the standard risk-free asset and a risky asset unrelated 
to France Télécom (e.g. an investment in equities unrelated to France Télécom).  
In the first two periods, the investor decides about his current consumption and about 
the composition of his financial portfolio.  In period one, the investor has the choice between   31 
five different assets.  The first asset is the standard risk-free bond.  The second asset is a 
slightly discounted share in France Télécom.  The share can be traded in period 2, and is 
meant to represent a simplified version of the Disponix and Simplix products, which have 
short holding periods in exchange for reduced purchase discounts.
50  To capture the 
discounts, the investors receive free shares as a function of the number of shares purchased 
based on the actual terms of the Disponix offering. 
Additionally, there are two illiquid, long-lived assets based on the France Télécom 
stock.  These assets cannot be sold in the intermediate period, such that any investment has to 
be held until period three.  The first illiquid asset, Abondix, is nothing more than the standard 
France Télécom stock, sold at a 20% reduced price.  Abondix also comes with a matching 
bonus and delivers a number of free shares as a function of the number of units purchased.  
The second long-lived asset, Multiplix, is downside protected: Investors have to pay the same 
price as for Abondix and are guaranteed a return of 25% on their personal investment in 
period three.  On top of the guaranteed repayment, investors receive a matching bonus in 
period one and ten times the positive difference between the period three share price and the 
period one share price as final payoff.  Multiplix thus delivers the upside on ten shares for 
each share purchased, and the guaranteed personal investment is augmented by an additional 
matching bonus.
51 
The model takes into account the rules applied to the granting of bonuses and free 
shares in the offering, and incorporates the constraints put on the amounts that can be 
invested into the long-lived assets.  In particular, for each level of period one labor income, 
not more than 25% of this amount can be invested in Multiplix and Abondix combined.  The 
bonuses as well as the implicit leverage in Multiplix count towards the constraint.
52  
  Finally, the period one investment opportunity set contains a risky asset unrelated to 
France Télécom.  This captures the possibility to invest into the stock market or other risky 
assets independently from the France Télécom offering.  Realistically, one would have to take 
into account that the French stock market, and probably most risky assets available to French 
retail investors, are correlated with the return on the France Télécom stock.  Instead we make   32 
the simplifying assumption that the return on the unrelated risky asset is orthogonal to the 
return on the France Télécom stock. 
In period two, the investor has to hold onto any illiquid assets Abondix and Multiplix 
bought in period one.  He then faces the standard consumption-savings decision, and has to 
allocate any additional savings between the two short-term risky and the riskless asset.  The 
only assets available for investment at in period 2 are risk-free bonds, standard France 
Télécom shares and the independent risky asset.  We assume that the investor receives no 
utility from bequests and consumes all his wealth in period three.  The uncertainty in our 
model unfolds as follows.  The one-period return on the France Télécom share is given by:  
(A1)   2 , 1 for    , , = + + = t premium R R t FT f t FT ε  
where Rf is the gross risk-free rate, premium is the equity premium and ε FT,t is a mean-zero 
shock to the stock return between period t and period t+1.  Similarly, the return on the 
unrelated risky asset is given by:  
(A2)   2 , 1 for    = + + = t premium R R t f t ε  
The investor in our model receives labor income in each period.  Period one labor 
income L1 is known with certainty, but second and third period labor income is risky.  It is 
subject to two random shocks, one of which corresponds to the shock to the France Télécom 
stock.  This formalizes the notion that human capital is a risky asset, and related to the 
performance of the employing firm.  The second shock represents idiosyncratic labor income 
risk, such as illness, layoffs, or unexpected income windfalls.  Shocks to labor income are 
persistent, such that a shock at t=2 affects income at t=3.  Formally, period-two labor income 
is given by:  
(A3)       ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 , 1 , 1 2 L FT L L ε ε ρ + ⋅ ⋅ + =  
where  ε FT,1 is the shock to the France Télécom stock return and ε L,1 is a mean-zero 
idiosyncratic labor income shock.  The covariation between labor income and stock returns is 
strictly increasing in the parameter ρ .  Labor income in period 3 continues to be subject to 
shocks to the France Télécom stock: 
(A4)       ) 1 ( 2 , 2 3 FT L L ε ρ ⋅ + =    33 
For simplicity, we set the idiosyncratic labor income shock in period three to zero. To prevent 
our investor from simply hedging the positions in the illiquid assets at t=2, we assume that 
short sales of both risky and riskless assets are prohibited.
53  All three sources of risk –ε FT,t , 
ε t and ε L,t – are mutually independent. 
The preferences of our investor are described by a constant-relative-risk-aversion 
utility function, a formulation that is common in the neoclassical portfolio selection literature, 
and we assume the standard Von Neumann-Morgenstern time-separability conditions.  Thus 
the investor's objective function is to maximize utility of consumption over the three periods, 
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where δ  represents the time discount factor, and γ  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
In order to solve the model, we assume that each of the three sources of risk –the 
France Télécom shock, the shock to the unrelated asset and the labor income shock– can take 
on only one of two values in each period.  We represent the underlying uncertainty in the 
form of a binomial tree and solve the model numerically by backward induction.  The 
standard calibration of the model uses the following parameter values: Initial wealth equals 
FF 200,000 and initial labor income equals FF 180,000 p.a.  The relative risk aversion (RRA) 
parameter is set to 5 and varied between 2 and 20.  This range is arbitrary, but relates to 
previous empirical work.
55  The individual time preference rate is equal to the risk-free 
interest rate at 5%, while the equity premium equals 6%.  The risk parameters in the baseline 
calibration are a 30% annual volatility for the France Télécom stock return, a 25% volatility 
for the unrelated risky asset and a 5% volatility for the independent labor income shock.  The 
outside risky asset has a more attractive Sharpe ratio than the France Télécom stock, 
capturing the idea that holding (for example) an indexed fund offers in general a more 
favorable risk-return tradeoff than holding a single stock.  The parameter controlling the 
covariation between stock returns and labor income, ρ , is set to 0.1   34 
Appendix B 
Estimating the threshold levels 
  This section describes the methodology for estimating the threshold levels below 
which latent individual investments would not be observable. The double-hurdle 
specification is closely related to the censored regression model first proposed by Tobin 
[1958] and the sample-selection models described by Heckman [1976].  It follows the model 
of Cragg [1971], in which the first hurdle is a probit model for participation, and the second 
hurdle is a censored regression for the contribution level similar to Tobin's model.
56 
  We illustrate the methodology for the simple case when there is only one threshold 
applicable to all individuals.  The underlying latent variable model is given by: 
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where y i* is the latent personal investment, which will be observed if and only if y i* is larger 
than some threshold level K.  The likelihood function of the standard Tobit model augmented 
by the threshold effect K is given by: 
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Here φ (⋅ ) and Φ (⋅ ) correspond to the standard normal pdf and cdf respectively.  The 
two parts in (B2) correspond to a classical regression model for the non-censored 
observations and to a Probit-type probability term for the censored observations.  The only 
non-standard feature of this formulation is the appearance of the threshold level as part of the 
constant term for the censored observations.  Note that estimating the model in (B1) as a 
standard Tobit model amounts to forcing the constants in the censored and the non-censored 
part to be equal, whereas the correct specification (B2) allows the constant term in the Probit   35 
part to be reduced by the threshold level. 
Heckman [1976] estimates the standard Tobit model in two steps, using the well 
known result that the expected value of a non-censored observation can be written as: 
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Here λ (⋅ ) stands for the inverse Mills ratio.  An estimate of λ (⋅ ) can be obtained by 
defining a dummy variable which takes the value one for participants and zero for non-
participants, and running a Probit regression for the participation decision.  This provides us 
with consistent estimates of  σ β α / ) ' ( i x K − − and hence consistent estimates of λ (⋅ ).  
Substituting these into (B3), we can estimate the contribution regression by OLS.  This in 
turn gives us consistent estimates of α  and σ .  Finally, combining the consistent estimates of 
α  and σ  from the contribution regression with the consistent estimate of  σ α / ) ( − K from the 
participation regression, we get a consistent estimate of the threshold level K.   36 
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Notes 
 
1. See for instance Blinder [1990] and the articles therein, Jones and Kato [1995], and Scholes and Wolfson 
[1990]. The case for employee ownership is advanced by the National Center for Employee Ownership 
(http://www.nceo.org). 
2. Brennan and Torous [1999] show that the welfare costs of under-diversification can be large. 
3. See Commission des Opérations de Bourse [1998]. This figure does not include households holding stock 
indirectly through mutual funds. 
4. 78% of France Télécom employees were civil servants. 
5. See Arrondel and Masson [1990] and Szpiro [1995]. 
6. We have been told that many employees did not understand why the stock price simulations in the offering 
documents included cases in which the stock price fell. After the offering, whenever the stock price went down, 
France Télécom received telephone calls from some employees asking for an explanation. 
7. Under the deal, the State would keep a stake of at least 51% in France Télécom; current employees would 
keep their civil servant status even after privatization, while new employees would acquire private sector status; 
and France Télécom would make a one-time payment to the State to fund its employees' pensions. 
8. The French State sold 23% of its stake, of which one-tenth (or 2.3% of France Télécom’s shares) were 
earmarked for the employee offering. The offering took place on September 23, 1997.  The offer price for 
individual investors was set at FF 182, while the price for institutional investors was FF 187.  The individual 
investor tranche was oversubscribed by 2.91 times, while the institutional investor tranche was oversubscribed 
20 times.  The first day closing price was FF 206.50, for a one-day return of 13.5% from the individual investor 
offer price.  The exchange rate around this time was approximately 6 FF/1$US. 
9. Might investing in the firm’s stock provide employees with a hedge against firm-specific human capital risk? 
Such would be the case if, for example, the stock went up at layoff announcements. In fact, Hallock [1998] 
documents that (contrary to conventional wisdom) layoff announcements are associated with negative stock 
price reactions.  
10. Quote taken from the informational brochures given to employees during the privatization.   
11. See Collat and Tufano [1994]. 
12. Multiplix cannot really be compared with the other plans on this dimension. 
13. What makes this loan peculiar is that the repayment is effected through the withholding of the dividends and 
tax credits (over the five-year life of the plan) and a variable repayment schedule at maturity that is a function of 
the ultimate France Télécom stock price.  In effect this loan repayment schedule is equal to the positive 
difference between the value of ten shares less the payoff to the employee described above.  The loan does not 
entail downside-risk since the employee is never required to repay more than the value of her shares after five 
years. 
14. The value of the Multiplix package is calculated using the Black-Scholes formula and assumes that the 
dividend plus the tax credit yield on France Télécom is 3.6%. 
15. An exception is Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese [1996]. 
16. See Laibson and Zeckhauser [1998] for a review of the impact of prospect theory on behavioral economics. 
17. Shiller [1997] discusses the difficulties in testing the behavioral approaches. 
18. In addition, there are constraints on the amounts investors can put into the long-lived assets, and the bonuses 
and free shares cause the expected return on any asset to be a decreasing function of the invested amounts. 
19. The standard calibration of the three period model uses the following parameter values: Initial wealth equals 
FF 200,000 and initial labor income equals FF 180,000 p.a.  The relative risk aversion (RRA) parameter is set to 
5 and is varied between 2 and 20. This range relates to extant empirical work.  Friend and Blume [1975] find an 
aggregate relative risk aversion coefficient of 2.  More recent findings attempt to calculate RRA coefficients for 
subsets of investors.  Brav and Géczy [1996]  find that RRA parameters for US households in 1980-1991 range 
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from 3 to upwards of 20.  Mankiw and Zeldes [1991] find RRA parameters of 36 to 100.  The individual time 
preference rate is equal to the risk-free interest rate at 5 percent and the equity premium is set to 6%.  The risk 
parameters in the baseline calibration are a 30 percent annual volatility for the France Télécom stock return, a 
25 percent volatility for the orthogonal ‘market’ asset and a 5 percent volatility for the independent labor income 
shock.  ρ , the parameter controlling the covariation between stock returns and labor income, is set to 0.1.  
20. This less than proportional increase corresponds to the hedging motive in Viceira’s [1997] model.   
Increasing labor income while holding financial wealth constant implies that the investor has more total wealth, 
but also more exposure to France Télécom.  While the wealth gain induces the employee to invest more, the 
positive correlation between labor income and stock returns dampens the desired investment.  The net effect is 
weak and not monotone, and depends on the ratio of labor income to financial wealth.  The non-monotonicity is 
due to the constraint that not more than ¼ of annual salary can be invested into the two long-lived assets 
combined.  Whenever we increase annual salary for constant initial wealth, this constraint is gradually relaxed, 
essentially enlarging the investment opportunity set available to the investor. 
21. The effects of risk aversion, human capital, firm-specificity of human capital and idiosyncratic labor income 
risk are not always monotone.  An investor with low risk aversion or low exposure to France Télécom may buy 
Multiplix purely to capture the high returns, an investor with medium risk aversion or medium exposure may not 
buy Multiplix due to the constraint on the combined investment into the long-lived assets, and an investor with 
high risk aversion or high exposure may again buy Multiplix to take advantage of the downside protection.  We 
find these non-monotonicities to be a robust phenomenon in our calibrations, but they are not large enough to 
reverse the broad patterns described in the text. 
22. France Télécom would not reveal individual employee’s salary nor divulge the entire mapping between 
salary grades and salary ranges.  They did provide detailed information about this mapping for broad subsets of 
salary grades (11 to 23, 31 to 33 and 41 to 46), broken down by gender. Based on these six data points, we fit a 
piecewise linear function to obtain estimates of the intermediate salary levels. Since there is no information 
available on salary levels at France Télécom subsidiaries, we retain the dummy variables for salary grades OE, 
AM, IN and CA. 
23. We do not have current salary levels for former, non-retired employees who left between 1992 and 1997 and 
use their last salary at France Télécom instead. This stale salary data is likely to underestimate the true current 
salary level if employees leave for better paying jobs. 
24. There are two rationales for why higher tenure should be associated with higher salaries and higher firm-
specific human capital.  Following Becker [1964], an employee’s firm-specific skills build up over time.  They 
increase the employee’s marginal productivity on the current job, but are useless when the current employment 
relationship is terminated.  Another line of reasoning argues that the quality of the match reveals itself gradually 
over time (see Jovanovic [1984]).  Good matches are more likely to survive than bad matches and result in a 
higher marginal product and wage payment to the worker.  See Topel [1991] and Williams [1991] for empirical 
evidence. 
25. See the discussion in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson [1992]. 
26. To improve the fit of the second order polynomial, we subtract the mean from age and age-squared when 
using it as an explanatory variable. 
27. The truncated regression specification uses a MLE framework, correcting for the bias that would occur if 
one merely ignored the non-participation data (See Hausman and Wise [1975] or Greene [1993]).  
28. Individuals with missing observations on some of the explanatory variables have been eliminated in the 
regressions in Table IV. This reduces the sample size from 205,076 in Table III to 167,064 in Table IV, Panel 
A, and to 111,912 in Panel B. 
29. The negative coefficient on the linear term in the INSEE wealth measure is dominated by the positive second 
order term.  This is true for the top 99% of the wealth distribution in both truncated regression specifications in 
Table IV, Panel B.  
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30. While the model predicts a less than proportional increase of personal contribution as a function of labor 
income, this prediction is derived holding wealth constant.  Clearly the INSEE measure is an imperfect proxy for 
wealth, and the labor income coefficients are likely to pick up much of the residual variance in wealth. 
31. For the first specification in Table IV, Panel A, the positive first order term in age dominates  until age 55, 
and for the second specification in Table IV, Panel A  the positive first order term dominates until age 77. 
32. The hedging demand is negative due to the positive correlation between human capital and stock returns.  
For a given level of wealth and firm-specificity of human capital, diminishing human capital makes the negative 
hedging demand smaller in absolute value.  
33. Sundén and Surrette [1998] document that women invest their retirement savings more conservatively than 
do men, even after controlling for marital status, age, and risk return/preferences. 
34. These findings hold in a multivariate setting.  Based on the Probit regression results, former employees were 
61 percentage points less likely to participate than current workers.  The truncated regression estimates show 
that former workers invested 21% more than current employees, other things equal. 
35. The possibility of threshold levels and fixed (information) costs of stock market participation has been 
discussed by Bertaut and Halliassos [1995], Bertaut [1998], and Vissing-Jorgensen [1999]. 
36. Rather than facing different costs, different potential participants could perceive different levels of benefits, 
either on the basis of systematically different levels of risk aversion or due to different expectations of the future 
success of a privatized firm. 
37. This procedure makes two simplifying assumptions: First, we assume that the threshold levels are not 
functions of the other independent variables, and are the same for all individuals in a dummy-indexed subset of 
individuals. Second, the threshold levels are assumed to be additive across groups.  For example, when the 
baseline threshold is estimated for male currently employed non-civil servants, then the threshold estimate for 
female currently employed civil servants is the sum of the baseline threshold and the incremental thresholds 
estimated for women and for civil servants. 
38. The calculations make the illustrative assumption that the investor would have chosen a value-maximizing 
portfolio.  Given the structure of the assets offered, this allows us to calculate the benefits the government had to 
offer to induce individuals to participate.  For current employees, the salary-based constraint on the investment 
into the two long-lived assets has to be taken into account when calculating value-maximizing portfolios.  The 
free benefits for retirees and former employees are calculated from the two short-lived assets only, and no 
salary-based constraints apply.  The fact that the long-lived assets were not available to former and retired 
employees explains why their high threshold levels translate into comparatively low levels of lost free benefits. 
39. The numbers in Table III, Panel C do not add to one because portfolios may contain multiple assets. 
40. The assets with five-year holding periods were not available to former employees. 
41. This is true unless we assume an implausibly low value for the volatility of the France Télécom stock. 
42. The situation is in fact slightly more complicated.  Since the 50% matching bonus on Multiplix is capped at 
FF 1,000, while the 100% Abondix bonus runs up to FF 3,000, there exists a small intermediate range in which it 
is marginally beneficial to add Abondix rather than Multiplix to the portfolio.  The subsequent analysis takes this 
complication into account and identifies only those investors who could have increased the value of their 
portfolio by substituting Multiplix for Abondix. 
43. Whether the individual portfolio also includes Simplix or Disponix is irrelevant for this analysis. 
44 The individual limits on the total investment into Abondix and Multiplix can be calculated from our estimates 
of the salary levels, as described earlier in the paper (see note 22). 
45. In order to test whether this strong violation of investor rationality is due to our misestimation of salary 
levels, we repeat the analysis requiring that an investor is further away form the salary-based constraint than 
necessary to purchase one unit of Multiplix.  Since for 75% of the inefficient investors the estimated slack under 
the constraint is more than FF 10,079, the results are essentially the same. 
46. The median inefficient investor could have increased the value of his portfolio by FF 8,573 (34%), and the 
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25% and 75% quartile improvements are FF 3,378 (9%) and FF 11,029 (67%) respectively. For 10% of the 
inefficient investors, the costless value increase would have been larger than FF 12,834 (77%), with a maximum 
of FF 30,055 (121%). 
47. Since a unit of Disponix costs FF 182 and a unit of Simplix only FF 145.60, the difference of FF 36.40 is 
added to the new portfolio as cash holding. 
48. If tenure is an imperfect measurement of the firm-specificity of human capital, the coefficient on tenure in 
our regressions will be attenuated.   
49. In a widely cited study, Oskamp [1965] documents that pyschologists’ confidence in their clinical decisions 
increased with more information, but accuracy did not.  Long tenure is likely to be correlated with a positive 
opinion about the prospects of France Télécom, which is then reinforced through the illusion of knowledge. 
50. In reality, Disponix and Simplix have different number of free shares, purchase discounts, and holding period 
tradeoffs, that we do not adequately capture in our simple model.  We make this simplification in order to 
concentrate on the longer-lived assets and to make the model more tractable.   
51. For simplicity, we ignore tax considerations and subsidized financing. 
52. The rules under which the discounts, bonuses and free shares are granted as well as the relevant constraints 
are described in detail in the body of the paper. 
53. Were employees able to sell stock short, they would have immediately purchased infinite amounts of the 
discounted asset, shorted them and earned arbitrage profits by “monetizing” the discount.   
54. Because we are trying to model the tradeoff between liquidity and return, we cannot assume that the investor 
is maximizing over final wealth, since in that case the portfolio weight on the liquid, low return asset would be 
zero.   
55. See note 19 in the body of the text for a discussion of the relevant literature. 
56. For an in-depth treatment of limited dependent variable models with selectivity, see Lee [1983].  A recent 
application of the techniques employed in this section can be found in Maki and Nishiyama [1996].   44 
                                                               Table I 
                    Description of the France Télécom Privatization Offerings to Employees 
 
This table summarizes the characteristics of the four share programs offered to France 
Télécom employees during its privatization.
a 
 
Program  Discount  Matching Bonus  Free Shares 




Payment Options  Guarantees  Limits 
Abondix  20% off of 
offer price 
8100% for first FF 3000 
850% for next FF 6000 
825% for next FF 66000 
8One for each 
share purchased up 
to FF 3000 
8One  for each 
four shares 
purchased for the 
next FF 3860  
Tax free 
c 5  years  8In cash 
8In three payments over two 
years 
d 
8In 36 monthly payments 
e 
8Through transfer from 
company pension plan 
f 
None PEG  limits 
g 
Multiplix 
h  20% off of 
offer price 
850% for first FF 2000 
8Plus 9 x ( personal 
contribution and bonus) as a 
guaranteed bank loan.  
8The investor forgoes 
dividends and tax credit 
None Tax  free 
c 5  years  8In cash 
8In three payments over two 
years 
d 
8In 36 monthly payments 
e 
57 
825 % return over 
five years on 
personal contribution 
8guaranteed 






than FF 9000 
Simplix  20% off of 
offer price 
None  8One for each 
bought share up to 
FF 3000 
8One for each 
four shares 
purchased for the 
next FF 3860  
Taxable 
i 2  years/ 
3 years for free shares 
8In cash 
8In three payments over two 
years 
8In 36 monthly payments 
e 
None  5 times the 
annual Social 
Security limit 
(FF 823,200 in 
1997) 
Disponix  none None  8One  for each 
three shares bought 
up to FF 6860 
Taxable 
i none/ 
1 year for free shares 
In cash only  None  5 times the 
annual Social 
Security limit) 








a. Eligibility: Eligible for all programs are (i) the personnel of France Télécom or of French subsidiaries of which France Télécom owns more than 50% of 
capital. To be eligible for access to the group savings plan PEG (Multiplix+Abondix) requires furthermore at least three-month seniority at the time of 
subscription. Only current employees can purchase Multiplix and Abondix. Employees with bad credit history are not eligible for participation in Multiplix. 
b. The free shares have a global limit of FF 6,860 for all share programs combined. Free share payments will be made to Disponix first, then Simplix, and last, 
Abondix. The maximum request for shares cannot exceed 5 times the Social Security limit, or FF 823,200 for 1997. 
c. Since the shares are held by the group savings plan (PEG), the bonus, capital gains and paid dividends are tax-free. Social security contributions (CSG/CRDS) 
are applicable.  
d. The three payments of 30% at delivery, 30% after one year and 40% after two years are interest free. 
e. The 36 monthly payments are interest free. 
f. Payments made through transfers from the pension plan carry no bonus. 
g. The total annual investment in the group savings plan (PEG) cannot be larger than one quarter of the annual salary of the employee. Furthermore, the total 
bonus paid into PEG cannot exceed FF 22,500, whereby the Abondix bonus is allocated before the Multiplix bonus.  
h. In order to participate in Multiplix, the employee must have bought at least one share in one of the other programs. 
i. Under the French tax regime, the first FF 8,000 of dividends for individuals, and the first FF 16,000 for couples are tax free.  Above this, dividends are taxed at 
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of Individuals Eligible  
to Participate in France Télécom Employee Share Offerings 
 
The table below shows information about the 205,076 employees eligible to participate in the France Télécom 
employee offering scheme in 1997.  Panel A reports age and job tenure (date of employment through time of offer.)  
Panel B shows the breakdown by type of participant, job category, and gender.  Panel C presents the sample by 
salary grade.  Salary grade code 11 is the lowest and 46 is the highest salary level.  Salary grades 11 to 23 indicate 
ordinary employees and technicians.  In this group the average monthly salary in 1997 was FF 12,562 for men and 
FF 11,928 for women.  31 to 33 are middle managers, with an average salary of FF 17,104 for men and FF 16,059 
for women.  Finally, 41 to 47 are managers, with an average monthly salary of FF 25,445 for men and FF 22,548 for 
women.  CD stands for cadre dirigeant (executive) while OE, AM and CA refer to employees at subsidiaries and 
stand for clerical/technical employee, foremen and manager respectively.  IN stands for indeterminate and refers to 
employees at both France Télécom and subsidiaries. 
 
Panel A 




Mean 44.  5  19.9 
Standard Deviation  10.4  10.5 





Number   Job category  Number   Sex  Number  
Current 
employee 




8,628  Non civil servant  38,010 
 
Female 80,146 
Retiree 22,357        
Total  205,076  Total   181,791  Total   204,590 
 
Panel C 
Salary Level   Number  Salary Level   Number 
11 1,102  42 6,981 
12 3,066  43 3,200 
13 17,313  44  1,378 
21 41,514  45  650 
22 52,000  46  161 
23 24,212  CD  130 
31 4,128  OE  9,207 
32 6,559  AM  2,664 
33 12,167  CA 7,189 
41 4,651  IN 2,650 
   Total 200,925   47 
Table III 
Offering Participation Statistics 
Panel A shows participation ratios and total number of eligible employees by class of employee: current, former, 
retired, civil servant and non-civil servant.  Panel B shows average personal contributions in French Francs of each 
employee class, and the personal contribution as a fraction of monthly salary.  This table considers only employees 
who chose to participate in the offering, thus represents personal contributions conditional on some contribution.  
The salary levels are estimated as described in the text.  The ratios for retirees and not-retired former employees are 
calculated on the basis of their last salary at France Télécom.  Panel C shows participation percentages for each type 
of the four assets broken down by employee type.  The Transfer class corresponds to the purchase of Abondix using 
the employee’s existing pension plan assets.  Retirees and former employees were not allowed to purchase Abondix 
or Multiplix.  These percentages need not add up to one as employees could participate in multiple share schemes. 
 
Panel A 
















62.8%  68.0%  66.5%  73.5%  37.8%       21.6% 
Eligible number 
of individuals  
205,076 174,091  135,891  38,200  22,357  8,628 
 
Panel B 































































Retirees  Former 
employees (not 
retired) 
Abondix   90.4% 97.2% 98.2%  93.6%  n/a n/a 
Transfer 
(Abondix) 
10.8% 10.9% 11.2%  9.6%  n/a n/a 
Multiplix  40.9% 44.4% 45.6%  40.1%  n/a n/a 
Disponix  11.5% 11.0% 10.9%  11.1% 16.7%  22.5% 
Simplix  21.8% 16.4% 15.3%  20.5% 92.8%  94.5% 
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Table IV
Analysis of participation in France Télécom
employee share offering program
Panel A shows the Probit analysis, while Panel B shows the truncated regression results.  In Panel A, the dependent
variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the employee requested any shares under any of the four programs, and
in Panel B the dependent variable is total employee contribution.  The independent variables are tenure, age, age
squared, claimant category, salary grade, estimated salary level and job category (not reported).  The claimant category
dummies are to be interpreted relative to current employees and the salary grade dummies relative to salary level 11, the
lowest. Salary levels can only be estimated for salary grades 11 to 46, and salary grade dummies are included for
employees at France Telecom subsidiaries. The estimated salary levels and the INSEE wealth measure have been
divided by 10,000.
PANEL A
Probit Regression Probit Regression
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant -0.9184 -14.68 -1.9554 -38.69
Tenure
current civil servants 0.0043 5.50 0.0110 14.84
current non-civil servants -0.0026 -2.14 -0.0002 -0.21
former
employees
0.0163 9.34 0.0227 13.06
Age -0.0104 -14.22 -0.0164 -23.47
Age squared -0.0001 -2.27 -0.0000 -0.81
Civil servant dummy -0.2201 -10.75 -0.1482 -7.53
Female dummy 0.1484 20.36 0.2551 35.35
Retiree dummy -0.8422 -14.03 -0.8636 -14.40
Former employee dummy -1.7318 -47.79 -1.7955 -49.43
INSEE wealth measure 0.0317 6.69 0.0353 7.47
INSEE wealth measure squared -0.0007 -6.08 -0.0008 -6.92
















46 (highest) 2.7471 13.82
…at subsidiaries* Clerical/Technical 0.7598 15.40 1.6469 51.93
Foreman 1.3774 24.70 2.2997 54.54
Manager 1.7225 33.35 2.6663 72.53
Indeterminate 2.0927 27.30 2.9338 45.13
N  167,064  167,064
* The lettered salary grade codes are for employees at majority owned subsidiaries of France Télécom. Indeterminate
refers to employees at both France Telecom and subsidiaries.  49 
PANEL B
Truncated regression Truncated regression
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 22324 4.57 -34240 -11.83
Tenure
current civil servants -267 -5.75 -435 -9.63
current non-civil servants -460 -6.93 -402 -6.06
former employees -411 -2.84 -439 -3.04
Age 198 4.37 372 8.43
Age squared -9 -3.51 -8 -3.18
Civil servant dummy -1586 -1.49 -1066 -1.01
Female dummy -5490 -13.02 -976 -2.28
Retiree dummy 5970 1.14 2144 0.41
Former employee dummy 7722 2.31 9139 2.73
INSEE wealth measure -1172 -4.25 -1326 -4.79
INSEE wealth measure squared 61 8.69 68 9.57
















46 (highest) 165104 22.97
…at subsidiaries* Clerical/Technical 7985 1.83 64196 36.55
Foreman 16446 3.62 72963 33.19
Manager 61855 14.20 117945 64.84
Indeterminate 28679 6.00 85252 33.73
N 111,912 111,912
* The lettered salary grade codes are for employees at majority owned subsidiaries
of France Télécom. Indeterminate refers to employees at both France Télécom and
subsidiaries.
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Table V 
Threshold Levels of Investment and Foregone Benefits 
 
Panel A shows the threshold level estimates for different subsets of individuals.  A value of FF 18,749 
for the reference group of currently employed male non-civil servants implies that individuals of this 
group have not participated if their desired (latent) investment is smaller than this threshold.  The 
incremental thresholds for women, civil servants, former employees and retirees are to be added to this 
baseline threshold.  Appendix B describes the methodology used to calculate these thresholds.  Panel B 
uses the thresholds to calculate the monetary value (in bonuses, discounts and free shares) an investor 
whose latent demand is just below the threshold has foregone.  For current employees, the salary-based 
constraint on the investment into the two long-lived assets has to be taken into account.  The threshold 
levels are calculated for three different gross salary levels, corresponding to the averages for ordinary 
employees/technicians, middle managers and managers.  The free benefits for retirees and former 
employees are calculated from the two short-lived assets only, and no salary-based constraints apply. 
 
Panel A: Thresholds below which the latent demand would not be observed
Employee characteristic Threshold
Reference group:
Currently employed male non-civil servant 18,749 FF
Incremental effects:
Female - 6,117 FF
Civil servant - 549 FF
Retiree + 8,110 FF
Former employee + 13,060 FF
Panel B: The amount of free benefits corresponding to the thresholds
Employee characteristic Total threshold Corresponding free benefits foregone by
















18,749 FF 26,213 FF 29,401 FF 34,921 FF
Currently employed
female non-civil servant
12,632 FF 24,551 FF 27,657 FF 32,055 FF
Currently employed male
civil servant
18,201 FF 26,215 FF 29,403 FF 34,923 FF
Retiree and male non-civil
servant
26,860 FF 15,182 FF
Former employee and male
non-civil servant
31,809 FF 16,421 FF  51 
Table VI 
Holding Period and Downside Protection Measures as a Function of Employee 
Characteristics 
Two-sided censored Tobit regressions for holding period and downside protection as a function of 
employee characteristics.  The dependent variable in the first column is the average contribution-
weighted ex ante holding period, in years.  The dependent variable in the second column is the fraction of 
the employee’s personal contribution invested in Multiplix (protected by puts).  This analysis is 
conducted only for employees who chose to contribute and is limited to current employees (former 
employees and retirees were not eligible for long-term plans, including Multiplix).  The independent 
variables are tenure, age, age squared, claimant category, the INSEE wealth measure, salary grade, and 
job category (not reported).  The claimant category dummies are to be interpreted relative to current 
employees and the salary grade dummies relative to salary level 11, the lowest.  The INSEE wealth 
measure has been divided by 10,000. 
 
* The lettered salary grade codes are for employees at majority owned subsidiaries of France Télécom. 
Indeterminate refers to employees at both France Télécom and subsidiaries. 
Holding Period Downside Protection
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 6.4627 33.88 -0.1075 -4.90
Tenure
current civil servants 0.0024 1.26 0.0004 1.79
current non-civil
servants
0.0200 7.47 0.0010 3.33
Age 0.0037 1.93 -0.0019 -9.05
Age squared -0.0001 -0.71 -0.0002 -14.96
Civil servant dummy 0.1483 3.48 0.0239 5.01
Female dummy 0.3688 20.95 -0.0230 -12.25
INSEE wealth measure -0.0156 -5.75 -0.0012 -4.05
Salary grades (FT)
11 (lowest)
12 0.5870 2.80 0.0244 1.03
13 0.3042 1.58 0.0151 0.68
21 0.2137 1.13 0.0401 1.84
22 -0.1678 -0.89 0.0773 3.55
23 -0.3072 -1.61 0.1023 4.68
31 -0.3792 -1.95 0.1078 4.84
32 -0.5830 -3.04 0.1268 5.75
33 -0.8007 -4.20 0.1248 5.69
41 -0.9521 -4.96 0.1355 6.13
42 -1.1036 -5.81 0.1350 6.17
43 -1.3364 -6.94 0.1425 6.42
44 -1.5382 -7.73 0.1546 6.72
45 -1.8023 -8.37 0.1485 5.91
46 (highest) -2.1007 -7.38 0.1167 3.40
…at subsidiaries* Clerical/Technical 0.3663 1.90 0.0695 3.14
Foreman 0.0667 0.33 0.1195 5.26
Manager -0.7257 -3.80 0.1281 5.82
Indeterminate -1.1357 -5.48 0.0543 2.22




Payoff of Multiplix vs. Abondix for the maximum allowed Multiplix investment amount  
Final portfolio value after five years of an initial FF 9,000 investment in either Abondix  or 
Multiplix, including all bonuses and free shares, assuming that the dividend plus tax credit yield 
on France Télécom is 3.6%.  The participation rate is given as a fraction of eligible participants 
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